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Dual Citizenship as a Path-Dependent Process1
Abstract 
Over the last few decades dual nationalities worldwide have increased rapidly. This is 
astonishing when one considers that a few decades ago citizenship and political loyalty to a 
national political community were considered inseparable. Overall, there has been a bumpy-
line trend towards increasing tolerance. Yet, the degree to which dual nationality is tolerated 
by states differs. Based on the findings of postnational and national perspectives, the 
analysis proposes to view tolerance and resistance towards dual nationality as a path-
dependent process. The questions dealt with are: What are the factors encouraging the 
generally increasing tolerance towards multiple nationalities? How can cross-national 
differences regarding de jure and de facto tolerance towards dual nationality be explained? 
The main tendency over the past decades has been the growing emphasis on individual 
rights vis-à-vis state prerogatives in liberal democracies. The expansion of de jure tolerance 
towards dual nationality has part of inter-, supra- and national-level developments, which are 
connected to diverse factors such as gender equity, understandings of nationhood, 
immigrant incorporation and general characteristics of the political systems.  
                                                
1 The editors of this volume and Aristide R. Zolberg provided helpful criticism. Thomas Faist also 
wishes to thank the School of International Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER) at Malmö 
University, where he spent the Spring of 2003 as the Willy-Brandt-Guestprofessor. 
Forthcoming in Alejandro Portes & Josh de Wind (eds.), Conceptual and Methodological 
Developments in the Study of International Migration, Special Issue of International Migration 
Review (2004). 
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Introduction 
Over the last few decades the number of cases of multiple nationalities worldwide has 
increased rapidly, and for various reasons this is being tolerated by more and more 
sovereign states. This is astonishing when one considers that a few decades ago citizenship 
and political loyalty to a specific national political community, were considered inseparable. 
Dual citizenship is thus a particularly interesting case for studying the prerequisites and 
contexts for policies directed at immigrants and politics around immigration issues. 
Nonetheless, the degree to which dual nationality is tolerated by states differs widely. The 
questions then are: What are the factors encouraging the increasing tolerance towards 
multiple nationalities? How can national differences regarding de jure and de facto tolerance 
towards dual nationality be explained?  
Generally speaking, the proponents of dual nationality in immigration states argue that state 
authorities need to create favorable conditions for the political integration of newcomers. 
They emphasize the individual rights necessary for successful incorporation. In a nutshell, 
the proponents of dual nationality insist, first, on the importance of social integration. This 
claim hinges on the observation that those states tolerating dual nationality have had, ceteris 
paribus, proportionally more immigrants naturalizing. In political debates, dual nationality and 
thus citizenship – understood as the set of institutionalized ties between the governed and 
the governing, which are based upon social and symbolic ties among citizens – is also 
justified as a mechanism to enhance political participation of immigrants, or to motivate 
political representatives to take into account immigrants’ interests, along with other tools 
such as political rights for resident non-citizens viz. denizens (e.g. Jones-Correa, 1998). 
Second, those in favor of tolerating dual citizenship point to the requirement of congruence 
between the people and the resident population. Thinking on citizenship has traditionally 
assumed some kind of congruence between the people (demos), state territory and state 
authority (cf. Jellinek, 1964:406-27). Ideally, citizens are the basic law-givers in a democratic 
society. The addressees of a law should see themselves as its authors (cf. Rousseau, 1966; 
Habermas, 1992). Third, according to a multicultural perspective, border-crossing ties of 
persons should or could be tolerated as constituting specific cultural resources which citizens 
with an immigrant background hold (Gerdes, 2000). Such transnational resources form part 
of the cultural repertoire which immigrants may need to act successfully in public life (cf. 
Kymlicka, 1995). This argument is found less often in public debates and academic 
discourse; probably because it is contested whether cultural rights as such could also form 
the basis for new divisions among citizens contradicting the notion of equal democratic 
citizenship (cf. Offe, 1998). 
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In contrast to the proponents of dual nationality who uphold the enabling function of states for 
immigrant incorporation, critics, first, emphasize that the individual migrants themselves need 
to adjust to the new political environment. They focus on the obligations of naturalizing 
immigrants who have to give proof of their readiness to adapt and to be loyal to the new state 
by renunciation of their previous nationality. Second, on the duty side of citizenship, dual 
nationality involves multiple loyalties and links of citizens across state borders or even within 
a world society. This has a direct bearing on issues such as dual military service and double 
taxation and thus pertains to state sovereignty. Third, and more importantly, dual citizenship 
raises the fundamental question if political membership across borders in democratically 
legitimated states can be designed in a way that it upholds the feedback loops between the 
governed and the governing. It is thus a question of democratic legitimacy and equal political 
rights. Empirically, we observe that national citizenship has developed over time in 
territorially enclosed, socially relatively coherent and inter-generationally viable political 
communities with effective state authorities (cf. Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). Ties of citizens 
reaching into multiple states seem to question the supposed congruence of the demos, the 
state territory and the state authority and, in particular, violate basic principles such as ‘one 
person, one vote’. It could lead to a certain degree of incongruence between demos and 
state authority because dual citizens could exert voice but still exit at will when the political 
outputs and outcomes do not suit them. One might ask whether loyalty and trust among 
citizens (cf. Putnam, 1993:ch. 6) are divisible. Multiple loyalties are often seen to damage the 
public spirit. Fourth, dual nationality may also create problems of output legitimacy (Easton, 
1967), if dual citizens withdraw from certain obligations or are seen to endanger national 
security. In those cases, dual nationality could give further incentives to populist politics.  
Nonetheless, the tolerance towards dual nationality is still increasing. In order to capture this 
truly seminal development, we need to expand our conceptual horizon and go beyond 
nationally-bound political systems to include a postnational perspective.2 This is one way to 
counter “methodological nationalism” (Hermenius Martin, 1974, quoted by Smith, 1979:191) 
in comparative political studies which has unduly privileged politics in national states, as if 
these systems could be thought as tightly bounded political containers. In short, national and 
postnational perspectives are necessary to give a satisfactory account of the development 
and consequences of dual citizenship in the context of immigrant policies and political 
                                                
2 The ongoing project “Multiple Citizenship in a Globalising World: Germany in Comparative 
Perspective” aims towards a more comprehensive analysis of the politics of dual citizenship in 
Europe. This project, which is housed at the University of Applied Sciences Bremen, is funded by 
the Volkswagen Foundation (2002-2005). The research compares the politics of three immigration 
countries – Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands – and two emigration countries – Turkey and 
Poland. The analysis in this article draws on results from the immigration countries. 
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incorporation. It means that each perspective is useful for explaining different parts of the 
puzzle: The postnational perspective on the extension of personhood rights vis-à-vis states 
highlights either the devaluation of national citizenship or the gradual extension of nationality 
as a human right, and the national perspective on political incorporation is helpful in 
accounting for variations in tolerance across national states. The results from both 
perspectives point in the same direction: in legal cases and legislation the rights of citizens 
and persons have gained in importance vis-à-vis considerations of state sovereignty. 
Methodologically, we propose to use the notion of path-dependency to trace the seminal 
trend towards an uneven yet clearly increasing tolerance of dual nationality in liberal 
democracies. The concept basically means that once political actors have started to move 
along a certain path – tolerating dual nationality under certain circumstances such as 
children out of bi-national marriages – there is every incentive to continue along the same 
way and serious disincentives exist to reverse course. The original incentives for starting 
down the path may arise out of different contexts, e.g. dual nationality as a tool for social and 
political integration in immigration countries, or dual nationality as a means used by 
emigration country governments to maintain the loyalty of expatriates (cf. Glick-Schiller and 
Levitt, this volume).3  
The first part defines the key terms nationality as a normative-legal notion, on the one hand, 
and citizenship as a normative-political concept, on the other hand. The second outlines the 
methodological tools of path-dependency. The third part sketches the two conceptual 
perspectives for analyzing dual citizenship: postnational and national. The fourth lists the 
factors which have led to a growing tolerance of dual nationality worldwide over the past 
decades and thus deals with state sovereignty. This includes an analysis of nationality as a 
human right, in this case the implications of international conventions for national law. The 
fifth part describes national variations in the de facto and de jure tolerance or even 
acceptance of dual nationality, ranging from a continuum from restrictive to liberal cases. The 
main purpose is to discern factors which account for nationally-specific modes of dealing with 
multiple nationality in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The concluding section then 
identifies some of the crucial mechanisms of path-dependency which have driven both 
tolerance and resistance towards dual nationality in particular and citizenship in general over 
the past decades. 
                                                
3 It is certainly no coincidence that many emigration states have also changed their laws to permit dual 
nationality even upon naturalization in an immigration country. Other measures include the re-
naturalization of former citizens and eased access to property and heritage for former citizens. Such 
countries include Mexico, Turkey, Tunesia, El Salvador, Colombia and the Dominican Republic (cf. 
Freeman and Ögelman, 1998).  
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Part One: Nationality and Citizenship 
Contested dual nationality implies the importance of citizenship as full membership in a 
political community. Nationality means full membership in a state and the corresponding tie 
to state law and subjection to state power. The interstate function of nationality is to clearly 
define a people within a relatively clearly delineated territory and to protect the citizens of a 
state against the outside, at times hostile, world. The intrastate function of nationality is to 
define the rights and duties of members. According to the principle of domaine reservée – 
exclusive competence, each state decides within the limits of sovereign self-determination on 
the criteria required for access to its nationality. One general condition for membership is that 
nationals have some kind of close ties to the respective state, a genuine link (Rittstieg, 
1990:1402).  
Citizenship, in contrast, essentially comprises three mutually qualifying dimensions: first and 
foremost, the notion of collective self-determination and democracy, second, the legally 
guaranteed status of equal political freedom and other rights and, third, membership of a 
political community. First, citizenship means above all the principle of unity of both governing 
and being governed, whatever form the democratic procedures of each state take in detail. 
Citizens endowed with equal political liberty obey the laws in the creation of which they 
participated and to whose validity they thus consent (Walzer, 1989). Without democratic 
procedures guiding citizens’ political self-determination, citizenship would only amount to 
members of political communities being subjects of a sovereign. Second, the constitutions of 
modern states enshrine human and fundamental rights of liberty belonging to citizenship as a 
legal status. In general, citizens’ rights fall into various realms, for example, civil or negative 
rights to liberty, political rights to participation such as the right to vote and to associate, and 
social rights – which in the Anglo-Saxon context not only means the right to social benefits in 
case of sickness, unemployment and old age, but in particular also the right to education 
(Marshall, 1964). It is highly contested whether, to which degree and for which category of 
citizens cultural or even group-differentiated rights should be a constitutive part of citizenship. 
The duties corresponding to citizens’ entitlements are the duty to serve in the armed forces in 
order to protect state sovereignty toward the exterior, while the duty to pay taxes, to 
acknowledge the rights and liberties of other citizens and to accept democratically 
legitimated decisions of majorities structure the internal sphere (cf. Habermas, 1992:371). 
Third, citizenship rests on an affinity of citizens to certain political communities, the partial 
identification with and thus loyalty to a self-governing collective. The qualifications required of 
citizens of modern national states is an affinity to their political community – often a nation 
(cf. Weber, 1972:242-244) or a multi-nation – that is, identification with a self-governing 
collective that is able to establish a balance between the individual and common interests on 
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the one hand and rights and responsibilities within the political community on the other. 
Affiliation to a collective, expressed as a set of relatively continuous, social and symbolic ties 
of citizens otherwise anonymous to each other, is linked to the status dimension because 
citizenship means the formalization of reciprocal obligations of members in a political 
community, akin to a social treaty (Dahrendorf, 1992:116). By means of laws and official 
norms, government institutions hold in trust networks of reciprocity and collectives of 
solidarity, which cannot be produced by the state itself.  
Nationality and citizenship are intricately related. The underlying argument here is that changing 
state-citizen relations and also state-denizen ties (cf. Motomura, 1998) have implications for the 
growing tolerance towards dual nationality. In international law, for example, nationality is 
increasingly seen as a human right. And on the national level, rights of non-citizens, in particular 
permanent residents viz. denizens in social science parlance (Hammar, 1990), have increased 
and changed the discourse on citizenship. One result has been that in countries such as the 
Netherlands and Sweden, dual nationality was discussed as an alternative to extending local 
voting rights for permanent residents from the local to the national level. 
Part Two: Towards a Description of Dual Nationality as a Path 
Dependent Process  
Globally, the tolerance towards dual nationality has increased steadily over the past few 
decades, albeit at a very uneven pace. The factors driving this growing tolerance point towards 
changes in basic factors enabling and structuring immigrant political incorporation in many 
immigration countries. To draw on a metaphor used for immigrant assimilation, this ‘bumpy-line’ 
(Gans, 1992) trend towards increasing tolerance constitutes a path-dependent development. 
There is no reason to suppose that the development of dual citizenship has to unravel as if 
ushered along by some historical teleology, a charge often advanced against T.H. Marshall’s 
triadic stages of the subsequent development of civil, political and social rights. Nonetheless, 
there is evidence to surmise that citizenship has been shaped by significant developmental 
pressures. 
To describe the growth of tolerance towards dual nationality as a path-dependent 
development means to specify the ‘positive’ feedback effects – what economists call 
“increasing returns” –driving this development (Pierson, 2000). The basic idea here is that 
once collective actors such as states and state organizations have started down a track, the 
costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, however, at which 
decisions have to be taken. A path-dependent effect occurs when a previous decision, norm 
or rule reinforces itself, when it determines in part the subsequent development of events. 
9 
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Decisions taken by national states and international organizations, over time, limit the range 
of available options at subsequent points. In so doing, they may encourage continuity in the 
form of retention of the original choice.4 In this analysis, the concept of path dependency is 
used to both uncover the main factors contributing to overall global trend towards growing 
tolerance of dual nationality in the postnational perspective and to identity the factors which 
explain the divergent paths selected immigration states have taken in this respect in a 
national perspective. 
Part Three: Two Perspectives on Dual Nationality – Postnational and 
National  
The growing interest in citizenship beyond the traditional understanding of territorial and 
exclusive liberal democratic states has been accompanied by the discussion of two 
noteworthy aspects. First, political issues and decisions migrate beyond national borders, 
and second, persons are perceived to be crossing state borders on a new scale (cf. Castles, 
this volume). In the national and more traditional perspective, however, the question of dual 
citizenship is predominantly defined as a problem pertaining to individual states and 
immigrant integration, while from the postnational perspective, dual citizenship is 
characterized as a result of international cooperation of national states. From a postnational 
point of view it is related to rights and democracy beyond the national state.  
The Postnational Perspective: Dual Citizenship as a Transitory Phenomenon  
The postnational concept comes in at least two variants: postnational membership and 
supranational citizenship. Postnational membership focuses on the impact of interstate 
norms upon citizenship in sovereign states. Supranational citizenship asks about the rights of 
citizens in multi-level governance systems such as the European Union (EU). 
                                                
4 The political-economic notion of path-dependence has a sociological counterpart, cumulative 
causation. Both concepts can be described by using the metaphor of a “funnel” in which, once an 
actor such as a state has taken certain decisions, it eliminates, by that very act, other possible 
courses of action. For example, a twenty-year-old college student has a wide range of possible 
career options at his fingertips which are not available to a forty-year-old professor who has heavily 
invested in that career path. Thus the concept of cumulative causation is similar to the notion of path-
dependence which is based upon the stable equilibrium concept in economics. Yet, unlike path-
dependency, which searches for the choices and consequences of processes, locked into a certain 
pattern, cumulative causation focuses on the very context and mechanisms that makes spiraling effects 
possible. Thus the concept of cumulative causation is a specific form of analyzing presumed causalities 
(Maruyama, 1962:175). In short, path-dependency seems to be more concerned about the choices of 
actors and their consequences while cumulative causation emphasizes processes that enable spiraling 
processes (positive feedback loops) or return to the original state of affairs (negative feedback loops). 
Here, the focus is on choices and results, not so much on the endogenous dynamics of and spiraling 
effects. 
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Postnational Membership: The main idea is that two of the three main components of 
citizenship – in the postnational membership concept simply rights & duties and collective 
identity – have increasingly decoupled over the past decades. Thus, for example, human 
rights, formerly tightly connected to nationality, nowadays also apply to non-citizen residents. 
In other words, settled non-citizens also have access to significant human, civil and social 
rights. Therefore, nationality as the ‘right to have rights’ is not anymore the fundamental 
basis for membership in political communities. Instead, discourses tied to international 
norms, such as the various charters on fundamental rights by the United Nations and the EU, 
are supposed to contribute to postnational citizenship or membership (Soysal, 1994). 
However, some postnational concepts primarily emphasize the devaluation of nationality and 
national citizenship and its replacement by a set of rights pertaining to personhood. It does 
not identify the international and supranational developments which underpin the emergence 
of nationality as a human right, overlooking the fact that rights accorded to non-citizens have 
repercussions for access to nationality. Also, this perspective cannot comprehend the 
democratically legitimated part of citizenship status and the importance of affective ties to 
and within states, i.e. the first dimension of citizenship discussed before. It is thus no 
coincidence that analysts often speak of postnational membership instead of citizenship. The 
popular legitimation of membership in political communities, of utmost importance for any 
democratic regime, gets lost. Instead, the focus is on courts who uphold interstate norms – 
“rights across borders” (Jacobson, 1995). The very basis of equal political liberty is neglected 
by the postnational membership concept. For example, the tension of political rights attached 
to both denizenship and citizenship is not considered. 
Supranational Citizenship: This concept primarily concerns citizenship in political multi-level 
systems such as the EU. At first sight, supranational citizenship appears as the logical next 
step in the centuries-old evolution of citizenship in what nowadays are liberal democracies. It 
is a current process much alike the one by which sovereign states have gradually centralized 
and assimilated local and regional citizenships over the past centuries. Over the past 
decades, this has occurred under propitious political-economic conditions, such as continued 
prosperity and the absence of war, and under the umbrella of a sort of a proto-federal 
system, the EU. The formidable obstacles on the road to substantive EU citizenship include 
the acceptance of democratic majority decisions and supranational social policies, and the 
resources necessary for the integration of political communities, such as trust and solidarity 
(cf. Delanty, 1996:6). European Union citizenship, as it has developed since the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1991), is not coterminous with dual citizenship, overlapping several sovereign 
states. Rather, it is a sort of multiple citizenships nested on several governance levels – 
regional, member state and supranational. Only citizens of a member state are citizens of the 
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Union (Faist, 2001). Yet in such a supranational perspective dual citizenship is ultimately of 
secondary importance only. It is only a transitory step to European citizenship. 
The National Perspective: Dual Nationality as a Mechanism of Immigrant Integration  
As a sort of anomaly, citizens living abroad belong to territorially and inter-generationally 
bounded political communities. It is no coincidence that many countries are usually more 
tolerant towards multiple nationalities of their own citizens living abroad if compared to 
immigrant newcomers in their territory. Nevertheless, in a national perspective there may be 
plausible reasons for tolerating or even accepting dual citizenship. The most persuasive is 
that dual citizenship increases the propensity among newcomers viz. immigrants to 
naturalize in the country of settlement. Some empirical surveys suggest that immigrants 
prefer maintaining their old citizenship when naturalizing in another country (cf. Chavez, 
1997:131). 
Part Four: The Postnational Perspective - Nationality as a Human Right  
When viewed from a postnational perspective, nationality has gradually emerged as a human 
right over the past decades. Supranational integration within the EU has furthered this trend. 
This meant, for example, that dual nationality has become one of the means to combat 
statelessness for categories such as refugees. Also, the legal norm of gender equity has 
ensured that dual nationality has spread. More specifically, the right of independent 
nationality for married women and the opportunity of either parent to pass on nationality to 
their children have left their mark. Supranational developments further show how 
postnational and national levels are interlinked, such as mutual recognition of nationalities 
within member states of the European Union. Such measures make it increasingly harder to 
exclude immigrants from so-called third countries from dual nationality within national states. 
As several cases suggest, such as Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands, granting dual 
nationality to nationals abroad makes it harder to exclude immigrants from the same benefits.  
The postnational perspective is most useful in outlining crucial inter- and supranational 
background factors conducive to the tolerance towards dual nationality. While the 
conventional postnational membership perspective suggests a decoupling of rights and 
identities linked to the citizenship status and asserts the increasing salience of rights 
attached to personhood, the empirical study of dual nationality adds an additional 
interpretation. Retaining the focus on personhood, one may usefully trace the emergence of 
the right to nationality as a human right, instead of emphasizing the importance of human 
12 
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rights discourses on denizenship rights. This has gone hand in hand with a growing change 
in legal perspectives concerning states and citizens. Whereas half a century ago the judiciary 
prioritized the state’s perspective when passing judgment on the genuine link persons 
entertain toward states (e.g. the famous Nottebohm case in 1955), international courts have 
increasingly begun to shift attention to the rights of persons. 
Nationality as a human right at first sight challenges the traditional notion of state 
sovereignty, as expressed in the notion of domaine reservée. According to this principle, 
every state has the sovereign right to determine the criteria for acquiring the nationality of 
that state. Traditionally, there are few matters which were more a symbolic expression of 
state sovereignty than the internationally recognized right of states to determine nationality. A 
few decades ago, most states on earth agreed that multiple nationalities should be avoided 
as best as possible. The preamble to the Hague Convention reads: “All persons are entitled 
to possess one nationality, but one nationality only.“ (League of Nations, 1930) State laws, 
bilateral treaties – such as the famous Bancroft Treaties the USA concluded with European 
countries around the middle of the 19th century – and interstate conventions such as The 
Hague Convention of 1930 and the European Convention on the Reduction of Multiple 
Nationality (Council of Europe, 1963) all bear testimony to this dominant belief. The rights 
and duties of states versus citizens were built on the assumption of the congruence of an 
almost holy trinity of territory, people and political regime (Montevideo Convention of 1933). 
The only conditions attached to the international recognition of a nationality have been that 
(1) it is related in a certain way to the legal system of the state in question, that (2) a so-
called genuine link exists between the state citizen and the respective state, and that (3) the 
self-determination of other states is likewise respected. Further restrictions may only arise 
out of international agreements. While these conventions did not carry the more binding 
character of international regimes, such as the fledgling human rights regime, they guided 
sovereign states’ declared policies.  
In concrete terms, two rules dominated law and state practice from late 19th century until the 
Cold War. First, acquiring a new nationality meant losing the previous one. Most states 
automatically excluded a citizen from membership when this person acquired the nationality 
of another state, or when other signs suggested that a citizen expressed loyalty to a foreign 
potentate – for example, serving in its army or voting in elections (Spiro, 1997). Political 
commentators used to connect dual citizenship to treason, espionage and a whole range of 
subversive activities. In many cases, countries of immigration required release from the 
original nationality upon naturalization. Second, since dual citizenship could never be 
avoided completely, some states dealt with the actual increase in multiple nationalities by 
13 
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providing for an optional rule. Upon reaching majority age the respective person had to 
choose one of the two nationalities. Otherwise, he or she risked to be expatriated (cf. Bar-
Yaacov, 1961).  
However, there has been a gradual and lengthy but fundamental shift from exclusive state 
sovereignty to the increasing recognition of the legitimate claims and rights of individuals. 
Particularly the post-World War Two human rights norms in international law have 
significantly constrained the states “sovereign prerogative paradigm” in nationality law (cf. 
Kimminich and Hobe, 2000). Of course, a significant expression of this change is Art. 15 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) according to which “[e]veryone has the 
right to nationality”. This article recognizes nationality as the precondition for effective 
individual rights. This provision, at least initially, only meant a minimal constraint of state 
sovereignty, because thereby no particular state is required to grant the right to citizenship. 
Like the right to emigration, the individual right to change one’s nationality is essentially of a 
negative kind. Furthermore, nationality as a human right has found its way only into one of 
the major human rights treaties adopted in the era after World War Two, namely the 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969); upheld by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (1988). Because states were reluctant to relinquish their right to determine the 
conditions of their nationality, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) in Art. 24, para. 3 only children were given the right to acquire a nationality. 
Nevertheless, there are meaningful international conventions and treaties, judgments of 
international courts and evaluations of nationality laws through intergovernmental 
organizations, which have strengthened the individual right to citizenship in several respects 
against the claims of states to define exclusively the rules of their nationality laws. Especially 
relating to the issues avoidance of statelessness and securing of gender equality, there have 
been more far-reaching conclusions in respect to the individual right to citizenship. Examples 
include the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in 1961; the Conventions on Dual 
Nationality by the Council of Europe in 1963, 1977, and 1997; the Convention on the 
Nationality of Married Women in 1957; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women in 1979. In sum, states’ regulations bearing on nationality can 
no longer be deemed within their sole jurisdiction but are circumscribed by their obligations to 
ensure the full protection of human rights (Chan, 1991). 
Also, supranational political integration has slowly increased tolerance towards dual 
nationality. Dual citizenship could be said to have an auxiliary function smoothing the road to 
European citizenship. For example, European integration has fostered the mutual recognition 
of multiple citizenships in the member states. For example, Germany does not require 
14 
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citizens of other member states to ask for release from their former citizenship when 
acquiring German nationality. Dual citizenship could thus be envisioned as a bridge between 
national and supranational citizenship.  
In sum, the evidence suggests that dual citizenship is not simply a foreboding of 
cosmopolitan citizenship. The main trend has been the spread of dual nationality and the 
tolerance towards dual citizenship as a result of an emerging trend of nationality as a human 
right. Importantly, the very principles national states have enshrined in their constitutions and 
agreed upon in international conventions, regimes and institutions have found their way back 
to shape legislation on nationality and the practices of citizenship. 
Part Five: National Variations in Integrating Nations and Immigrants 
The extension of denizenship status and cultural pluralism in many western European 
countries since the 1970s has also brought the question of political rights and the franchise 
to the fore. This has been helped by developments identified through the postnational 
perspective, the emergence of nationality as a human right and rights for denizens. Dual 
nationality has become one of the legitimate means to achieve the congruence between the 
resident population and the demos. In those countries where dual nationality became a 
matter of political debate and legal regulation, efforts to advance social integration and to 
thus extend the franchise to non-citizens on the local and national level preceded those on 
multiple nationalities. Mostly, social integration policies favorable to dual citizenship were of a 
multicultural kind. These culturally pluralist policies have, at least discursively, expanded the 
range of legitimate ties immigrants may hold.  
This comparative sketch probes into the question of why we observe different degrees of de 
jure tolerance towards dual nationality across European states. Over the past years, a great 
many immigration states have made naturalization less and less dependent upon release 
from their former nationality. This trend clearly pervades nationality laws and regulations. 
Examples include France in 1973, Portugal in 1981 and Italy in 1992. Others have only made 
minor concessions, such as Germany. Yet even those national states who, in principle, strive 
to avoid dual nationality, usually have some exempting rules. In general, such regulations 
apply when the former state refuses to release the citizen from nationality, or makes the 
release dependent upon unreasonable conditions; for example, the rule that young men 
need to serve in the army before being discharged from nationality. The analysis suggests 
that nationally-specific modes have shaped the politics surrounding the varying degrees of 
tolerance of dual citizenship found in the respective countries.  
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As to the cases selected, there are two ways of classifying tolerance and restriction towards 
dual nationality. The first is to look at states’ de jure toleration vs. restriction towards dual 
nationality. The second is to analyze the de facto behavior of states. Fundamentally, dual 
nationality arises when children are born in countries where the ius soli principle holds, while 
the countries of their parents’ origin apply the ius sanguinis principle. Also relevant for de 
facto tolerance is when states are indifferent to dual nationality for various reasons. For 
example, despite the ‘oath of allegiance’, the USA does not require written evidence that 
immigrants have actually renounced a previous nationality. Other countries such as the UK 
do not even regulate dual nationality (Hansen, 2002). Here, the analysis focuses on the de 
jure dimension. The comparative analysis includes Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
These three countries have varying policies on the acceptance of dual citizenship and can be 
classified accordingly on a continuous scale ranging from restrictive to tolerant and, finally, 
open. The most restrictive cases are characterized by the following criteria: 
(1) Assignment by birth: only one nationality possible; 
(2) Obligation to choose a nationality on reaching maturity; 
(3) Renunciation requirement (in some cases also proof required) upon naturalization in 
another country; and  
(4) Forced expatriation upon naturalization in another country. 
The more stringently the acquisition of a nationality corresponds to the principles (1) to (4), 
the more restrictive the regime – and conversely, the more lenient the procedure, or the more 
exemptions there are from these requirements, the more open the regime in question is to 
dual citizenship. The most important form of de jure tolerance in this respect is the 
abolishment of the renunciation requirement. 
Of the three immigration countries, Germany is the most restrictive de jure, the Netherlands 
more tolerant, and Sweden has followed in 2001, now being the most liberal. Although the 
recent extension of the ius soli clause in Germany’s nationality legislation is extremely 
generous in comparison to that of other European states, the principle of avoiding dual 
citizenship is de jure to be adhered rather strictly. The individuals in question must, by the 
end of their 23rd year, opt for one or the other nationality, and may otherwise be deprived of 
their German nationality. As before, in the case of naturalization – apart from the special 
case of late repatriates of German origin (so-called ethnic Germans or Spätaussiedler) – the 
relinquishment of the previous citizenship is generally required. Nevertheless, several 
exceptions apply, for example, when there are overriding constitutional grounds, or if there 
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are no provisions for the relinquishment of the nationality of the other country in question, or 
if it is refused or obstructed.5 For a while during the early 1990s in the Netherlands, dual 
nationality was tolerated without exception on naturalization, but the relinquishment of the 
prior nationality is now generally required again. Compared with Germany, however, there 
are much more extensive exemption clauses. In Sweden, by comparison, dual citizenship is 
now accepted in general. Sweden previously belonged to the restrictive category and 
demanded the relinquishment of the previous nationality (Figure 1).  
The propositions guiding the cross-national analysis6 are the following: 
(1) The respective understandings of nationhood and explicit culturally pluralist policies 
directed at immigrants are decisive factors. A republican understanding of nationhood7 tends, 
at a minimum, to foster indifference towards dual nationality. However, it is questionable to 
which extent the ethno-cultural vs. republican distinction is applicable to the countries 
concerned. Second, for de jure tolerance of dual nationality to take hold, culturally pluralist 
                                                
5 In general, the reality of law has been more tolerant than the letter. For example, there are crude 
estimates that more than a quarter up to one third of all those naturalized in Germany in the 1970s 
and 1980s – apart from ethnic Germans – kept their former citizenship and thus were dual citizens. 
In 2000, already more than 40% of all naturalisations in Germany occurred under maintenance of 
the original citizenship. In the Netherlands, the tightening of the rules in 1997 did not significantly 
affect the share of persons who kept their original citizenship.  In 1996, 80 percent of those persons 
who naturalized retained the original citizenship. In 2000, after the re-installation of the renunciation 
demand, the proportion still amounted to 77 percent (de Hart, 2003). 
6 The summary of the German case is based on the studies of Faist et al. (2003b and 2003c); the 
Swedish case draws on the work by Spång (2003); and the analysis of the Dutch case rests on de 
Hart’s (2003) analysis. 
7 A republican understanding of nationhood is based on the premise that government in a republic is in 
principle the common business (res publica) of the citizens, conducted by them for the common good. 
The concept of nation is focused on a state (Staatsnation), in which citizens run their own affairs. 
Inclusion of all permanent residents into the nation and thus nationality is seen as a basis for public 
mindedness. Access to nationality is based on the subjective avowal of loyalty of individuals to the 
nation. In this sense republicanism strives to ensure an optimum of equal opportunities regarding 
political participation for all those (permanently) residing in the territory of a state. According to this 
definition, republicanism does not necessarily mean that public affairs should take precedence over 
the citizens’ private life. An ethnic understanding of nationhood also holds that government is based 
on popular consent and participation. Yet, in contrast to a republican understanding, the nation is 
focused on the idea of a common culture (Kulturnation); historically even preceding statehood. 
Inclusion into the nation is traced to common descent, cultural traditions or lineage. There is less 
scope for persons for making their own decisions on the issue of nationality. Political participation and 
opportunities are seen and interpreted as an issue of intergenerational continuity. 
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viz. ‘multicultural’8 policies and discourses are also supportive, especially if connected with 
republican elements. Culturally pluralist policies towards immigrants have steadily gained in 
importance in European countries of settlement over the past decades (cf. Brubaker, 2001). 
The tolerance towards dual nationality is coupled tightly with the enfranchisement of 
immigrants in their role as denizens or citizens. The two factors overlap in cases such as the 
Netherlands and Sweden, where local voting rights and dual nationality have been seen, at 
times, as part of minority or multicultural policies; inspired by an integrative understanding of 
nationhood.   
(2) The eventual legislative output is decisively mediated by nationally-specific modes of 
politics which form part of broader institutional – legal and political – opportunity structures 
and prevail in the field of immigrant integration, such as competitive party politics in 
Germany, corporatist consensus politics in Sweden, and a slowly eroding elite consensus in 
the Netherlands. 
 
Germany: Competitive Party Politics and Mainstream Populism  
The most recent changes in German nationality law which went into effect in 2000 facilitated 
the naturalization of foreign citizens who have lived in Germany for a certain length of time, 
and the automatic acquisition of German nationality by birth for the second and third 
generations – i.e. the extension of the principle of descent (jus sanguinis) and the principle of 
naturalization based upon socialization of young persons by the application of the principle of 
territoriality (jus soli). Another major issue of the debate was whether as a rule naturalization 
required the relinquishment of an individual’s previous nationality or whether multiple 
nationalities should be tolerated to a greater degree than before. The chancellor of the new 
Red-Green governing coalition announced that new nationality legislation would make 
Germany ‘compatible with Europe’. Interestingly, after a short and highly politicized public 
debate in early 1999, the rules for including the second generation were more liberal than 
demanded by the government while dual nationality was not allowed as a rule. However, by 
                                                
8 Multicultural policies are based on the assumption that a person’s possibility to uphold her own 
cultural traditions, language and religion is crucial to personal identity and self-confidence and 
therefore a precondition for successful economic, social, cultural and political integration. 
Multicultural policies include various forms of public support for immigrant organisations and their 
cultural practices, the provision of the immigrant languages in schools and rights concerning their 
religious freedom and practices. Assimilationist policies, by contrast, aim towards the melting of 
immigrants into the majority core of an immigrant state viz. society. No special provisions for 
immigrants are desirable in the political or cultural realm in order to foster their integration into the 
mainstream.  
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adding the jus soli rule, the German government added impetus to the de facto growth of 
multiple nationalities. 
The run-of-the-mill explanation for Germany’s lag in adopting a more liberal nationality law 
has been that the so-called ethno-cultural concept of nationhood presented a formidable 
obstacle (cf. Brubaker 1992). This argument not only neglects changes in German political 
culture since 1945, disregards the division of Germany until 1989 and the subsequent 
speedy reforms of nationality law, such as the introduction of as-of-right naturalization in 
1993. It is also not supported by an analysis of parliamentary and public discourses on 
nationality legislation during the 1990s. There is not much evidence for explicit references to 
an ethnic or cultural understanding of citizenship among the opponents of dual nationality. 
Quite to the contrary, the opponents have consistently called for strengthening the 
renunciation rule for German citizens living abroad – at odds with an ethno-cultural 
understanding of nationhood. Moreover and ironically, tolerance towards dual nationality has 
been higher under the old nationality law dating back to 1913 (RuStAG) than in the 
subsequent reforms in 1977, 1991 and 2000. A factor directly impinging on the prospects for 
increasing de jure tolerance towards dual nationality has been the discursive use of 
‘multiculturalism’. While Germany would score somewhat lower than the Netherlands or 
Sweden regarding actually existing culturally pluralist policies towards immigrants (e.g. Rath 
and Groenendijk, 2000), it is also crucial that in political debates ‘multiculturalism’ has been 
elevated to become the polar and negatively loaded opposite to Germany not being a 
‘country of immigration’ position in academic and political debates during the 1980s and 
1990s. Indirectly, multiculturalism entered the citizenship debate only as a dystopic vision, 
when the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), which opposed increasing tolerance 
dual nationality, succeeded in tying nationality to allegedly mounting immigration. 
To connect dual nationality to issues of immigration, crime and security and thus treat it as a 
meta-issue, i.e. far remote from the political issue at hand, has been helped by extremely 
contentious party politics. This type of politics has largely determined the political opportunity 
structures regarding immigrant insertion. Since the 1970s, immigration and nationality issues 
have – intermittently – served as rallying posts for center right parties. Thus, mainstream 
parties have selectively used populist strategies in party competition. In the debate on dual 
nationality, the CDU instigated a signature campaign against dual citizenship. It proved very 
successful; more than 5 million signatures against the proposed new citizenship law. 
Ultimately, it was one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Social Democratic and the 
Green parties in the state elections in Hesse in early 1999. 
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The Netherlands: Slowly Eroding Elite Consensus 
Debates on dual nationality partly developed out of earlier efforts to enfranchise non-
nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1970s, self-appointed advocates of immigrants 
started to push for local voting rights for non-citizens. In the 1980s, a majority of political 
parties hoped that enfranchisement could serve as a symbolic means to show that the 
government was responding to the need to improve the social position of non-nationals; 
responding to events such as the Moluccan train hijacking in 1974 and subsequent violent 
incidents. Local voting rights, instituted in 1985, were considered part of ‘minority policies’ 
meant to advance social integration of immigrants. Policy makers justified both local voting 
rights and dual nationality (1991-97) with the claim that they would ease social integration 
and serve as tools for immigrant incorporation. Individual rights were meant to accompany 
incorporation policies aimed at immigrant groups along established institutional structures of 
representation and consultation in the political, social and religious spheres. This approach 
was helped by the tradition of pillarization (verzuiling) which could be applied to immigrants 
as well. In the late 1980s, it became clear that a left-right coalition for an extension of the 
franchise for denizens to the national level was impossible because liberal and right-wing 
parties blocked. Subsequently, the discussion on political insertion turned to dual nationality. 
Dual citizenship also entered debates as a result of the realities of gender equity which were 
to be accepted. Since the 1960s women did not follow the status of their husbands 
automatically. And since the mid-1980s Dutch fathers and mothers could pass on nationality 
to their children, both in the Netherlands and abroad. In effect, this led to a de facto increase 
in dual nationality. Finally, the renunciation requirement was abolished and dual nationality 
practically accepted in 1991. However, the policy changed back again in 1997, now 
demanding renunciation of the former nationality naturalizing immigrants. Accordingly, formal 
citizenship law was changed in 2000, and came into effect in 2003. Nonetheless, when 
compared to more restrictive cases such as Germany, more exceptions still persist. The 
current law still accepts formal ties to more than one country acceptable for categories such 
as spouses in mixed marriages, children born of mixed marriages and second generation 
immigrants.  
The Dutch case suggests that conceptions of the nation and nationhood have been changing 
constantly and in tandem with understandings of immigrant integration. In the 
Minderhedennota of 1983 – the government report initiating ‘minority policies’ – the Dutch 
nation was portrayed as a territorially bounded multiform viz. multicultural society. The Nota 
Integratiebeleid of 1994 reflected the policy shift away from cultural to socio-economic and 
from collective to individual concerns. This report used the dominant image of a Dutch nation 
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built around an autochthone core, open to the rest of the world. This latter document and the 
Allochtonenbeleid  of 1989 manifest a change in immigrant insertion policy, a move from 
‘minority policy’ of the 1980s to ‘integration’ or ‘allochtonen’ policy, also called inburgerungs-
policy. Interestingly, the concept of citizenship emerged as the leading principle of the ‘new 
version of the persons of different cultures in the Netherlands’ (Groenendijk and Heijs, 1999). 
The focus shifted from cultural pluralism to individual responsibility as a means to advance 
integration of the immigrant categories considered problematic, i.e. Surinamese, Moroccans 
and Turks. Language and civics courses for immigrants have since then become dominant 
integration schemes.  
Unlike Germany, politicians and political parties in the Netherlands agreed to keep 
immigration out of political campaigns until the late 1990s. This was possible because of a 
consensus among the political elite of keeping contentious issues out of public debates. One 
of the most visible outcomes was the 1991 law. It emerged as a political compromise 
between the main political parties. How much immigrant integration policy dominated the 
reasoning on nationality rules can be seen in the fact that the legislators did not discuss or 
consider the issue of multiple bonds to several states. Instead, not surprisingly, the formula 
was to improve the legal position of immigrants in order to foster social integration. However, 
as it became visible that social problems among certain immigrant categories persisted, 
politics became more contentious and the elite consensus began to erode. As in the German 
case, the main political parties fell into two blocks. The Social Democratic PdVA and the left 
liberal D66 continued to favor tolerance, while the conservative-liberal VVD and the Christian 
CDA demanded to uphold or reinstall the renunciation demand. The main ideological fault 
line was the use of naturalization as a way to stimulate the social integration of immigrants. 
Since the mid-1990s other issues have also been brought into the public arena, such as dual 
loyalties and immigrants as calculating citizens who collect passports. Thus the issue of dual 
nationality has increasingly become part of a politicized discussion on immigrant insertion.  
 
Sweden: Socio-political Nationhood and Political Equality - Consensus Politics 
Like in the Netherlands, the Swedish debate emerged out of discussions on social integration 
policies. More specifically, the discussion on dual nationality started as a continuation of 
voting rights for resident non-citizens. After the government granted local voting rights in 
1975, advocates of immigrant rights demanded to extend enfranchisement to the national 
level. While this proposal encountered strong opposition, dual nationality entered political 
debates as an alternative to voting rights for non-citizens. This discursive window widened in 
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the mid-1980s, when the government instituted a parliamentary commission to explore 
opportunities for dual nationality. Yet most parties rejected the proposal. In 1990, the Social 
Democrats suggested to explicitly allow multiple nationality. The governing Center-Right 
government blocked and withdrew the proposition. Their stance shifted when yet another 
government commission on citizenship began to with nationality and citizenship in broad 
terms in 1997. This time it was the commission which asked the government for permission 
to propose changes in dual citizenship. While the multicultural rhetoric of the mid-1970s had 
been discarded by that time, the principle of political equality and, above all ‘freedom of 
choice’ (valfrihet) for immigrants, were very much alive and enjoyed widespread majority 
support among politicians and the populace. Freedom of choice concerned the right of 
immigrants to choose whether to retain their cultural tradition, hence forming the linchpin of 
multiculturalism in its 1970s version. By the late 1990s freedom of choice had become part of 
so-called ‘integration policies’. Moreover, one of the most widely discussed arguments in 
favor of accepting dual nationality was the principle of gender equity. Gradually, from the 
1950s onwards – in accord with international law – the principle of gender equity became 
more important than avoiding multiple nationalities. Also, fair treatment of Swedish citizens 
naturalizing abroad and immigrants naturalizing in Sweden played a role in the discourse. In 
1979 the Swedish government took steps to allow Swedish citizens to acquire other 
nationalities without renouncing their Swedish citizenship. However, that was not fully 
recognized and put into practice until 2001. 
In terms of the understanding of nationhood and its importance for nationality and citizenship, 
Sweden is a clear example of how restrictive and misleading the republican vs. ethno-cultural 
dichotomy can be. For the Swedish case, a sociopolitical understanding of citizenship, 
usually referred to by the shorthand of the ‘people’s home’, is important for understanding 
both immigrant policies in general and citizenship politics and policies in particular. In the 
past, the ‘people’s home’ was a way to envision and mobilize support for the social 
democratic welfare state project. It also has often been taken as a shorthand description of 
the welfare state program in Sweden more generally. There are various interpretations of its 
meaning. The first implies a scheme of social cooperation between citizen-workers, built 
around accommodations between capital and labor and other interest organizations and 
parties. Although the ‘people’s home’ may be seen to carry elements of an ethno-cultural 
understanding of nationhood – cultural cohesiveness enabling strong social solidarity and 
reciprocity on a national level – it can also be interpreted as a break with ethno-cultural forms 
of nationalism and geared towards social inclusion on the basis of political equality and 
freedom. A second interpretation hinges on the articulation of Swedishness on the one hand, 
and the differentiation between the normal and the pathological, on the other hand. This form 
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of the ‘people’s home’ nationalism was especially prevalent at the turn of the 19th and 20th 
century, as evidenced by policies towards the Saami and the Roma. These latter groups, 
along with immigrants, became the targets of multicultural policies in their first phase during 
the late 1970s. The socio-political connotations of the ‘people’s home’, especially those 
regarding the first interpretation, may have made it easier to introduce dual nationality. 
Regarding policies of cultural pluralism, dual nationality could be cast as an extension of the 
freedom of choice principle stemming from the 1970s. In 2000, it was beneficial to apply this 
principle to citizenship because dual nationality does not involve contentious group rights but 
pure and simple individual rights. 
As to the institutional opportunity structure, Swedish politics in general and immigrant 
accommodation politics in particular have occurred between consensus politics with a focus 
on seeking broad societal and political majorities on the one hand and block politics of the 
left and the center right parties on the other hand. Although, as in the German case, no right-
wing populist party of national importance existed, mainstream parties, unlike the German 
case, refrained from exploiting the citizenship issue in a populist fashion. In addition to 
consensus politics, this characteristic further contributed to the fact that the dual nationality 
issue never sparked heated public debates and strong media attention. As to the discursive 
opportunity structure, it is remarkable how strong the argument of political equality was in the 
discussions of the 1980s and 1990s. It was applied to equal treatment of Swedish citizens 
acquiring abroad and denizens naturalizing in Sweden – but also to more arcane and indirect 
arguments about the minimal difference in rights between denizens and citizens: since this 
difference was already so small, it would make little sense not to tolerate dual nationality. 
 
Preliminary Lessons from the Comparative Analysis 
The comparative analysis has profound implications for our understanding of nationality and 
citizenship politics. In general, there is convergence in the de facto tolerance (jus soli 
principle) and de jure tolerance (e.g. arising out of international law such as gender equity) 
towards dual nationality, on the one hand. However, the incorporation processes in all three 
countries analyzed differ substantially. This is obvious in rules relating to the relaxation of the 
renunciation requirement. This observation confirms the conclusion that immigrant 
incorporation policies in European countries have both converged and remained distinct 
along particular national patterns (cf. Freeman, this volume). 
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Overall, the evidence presented suggests that politically inclusive understandings of 
nationhood coupled with explicit multicultural or minority policies and political rights for 
permanent residents have established a favorable context for increasing tolerance towards  
dual nationality. Yet, there are three more specific findings. First, the classical dichotomy of 
republican vs. ethno-cultural concepts of nationhood and its significance for naturalization 
rules have to be re-examined and specified. Not only are such understandings subject to 
historical change, as the German case would suggest. More important, this distinction does 
not capture the specific mix of republican and ethnic understandings of nationhood which are 
relevant for understanding citizenship. As the Dutch and Swedish cases make clear, for 
example, socio-political interpretations of nationhood connected to welfare statehood have 
been decisive for legislation on nationality. Also, classical republican understandings of 
nationhood, such as the ones found in France and the USA, may foster indifference towards 
dual nationality (de la Pradelle, 2002 on France and Renshon, 2001 on the USA). Yet more 
explicit forms of recognition of dual nationality can be found in countries not typically 
associated with classical republicanism, such as Sweden. In general, politically inclusive 
understandings of nationhood in the liberal democracies analyzed are path-dependent 
factors which have changed over time but are not easily reversed. The choices that flow into 
the construction of such understandings have usually taken decades to crystallize.  
Second, this finding indicates that other sets of factors, such as culturally pluralist policies 
may play a role. This means that understandings of national integration viz. nationhood 
usually have to be examined in conjunction with political rights for permanent residents and 
the prevailing modes of immigrant policies, ranging from multicultural to assimilationist 
policies. In two of the cases considered – Sweden and the Netherlands – debates and 
conflicts around dual nationality arose out of efforts to further enfranchise denizens, i.e. to 
extend the franchise for certain categories of non-citizens from the local to the national level. 
And even in Germany the first legislative efforts to deal with multiple nationalities (1993) 
came in the aftermath of a failed attempt by two northern German Länder to introduce local 
voting rights for permanent residents. This finding indicates that dual nationality has to be 
interpreted as part of the broader question of which political rights should be granted to 
immigrants and in what sequence. The general trend towards an extension of rights to non-
citizen immigrants, which can be observed in Western Europe and North America since the 
1960s, has led to a renewed discussion of political rights for non-citizens, and citizenship as 
a tool towards integration or a result of integration. Also, it has opened the question whether 
political citizenship rights such as the franchise on the national level should also be 
accessible to denizens (cf. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002:ch.3). While the jury is still out on 
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this question, it seems evident that rights for permanent residents have gradually 
strengthened and contributed to discussions on the extension of political rights for 
immigrants. This is another example of a gradual shift from a state-centric perspective on 
citizenship to a person-centered view; not engendered simply by international law but 
primarily arising out of constitutional principles in liberal democracies. This development is 
also part of discourses and actual policies surrounding explicitly multicultural policies directed 
at immigrants. Both political rights for denizens and dual nationality have been conceived as 
part of minority policies in the Netherlands during the 1980s and multicultural policies in 
Sweden during the second half of the 1970s and during the 1980s. While the labels for such 
policies may have changed, the substance has remained intact. 
Third, however, the Netherlands and Sweden accepted dual nationality de jure at a time 
when multicultural rhetoric was on the wane and were gradually replaced by discourses on 
individual responsibility and citizenship. Dual nationality thus seems to be a substitute for 
explicit minorities or multicultural policies.  This is not surprising because nationality and 
citizenship are concepts predicated on individual and not on collective rights. The latter are 
often seen in public and academic debates – rightly or wrongly – as main ingredients of 
multicultural policies. Arguments in favor of tolerating dual citizenship in reform debates, 
which emphasized the legal recognition of border-crossing social and symbolic ties of 
persons, have often taken recourse to multicultural ideas. The shift from multicultural to 
nationality and citizenship policy also suggests that citizenship has emerged as a common 
denominator for immigrant political insertion. This is true for countries such as Sweden and 
the Netherlands, and for more classical republican countries such as France and the USA. 
Also, in Germany, the draft for a new immigration law provided for education in civics as one 
of the central instruments for integrating newcomers. In sum, dual citizenship has become 
part of the trend towards a revalorization of full political membership in many immigration 
countries, and the resurgence of the ‘good citizen’, who is nowadays often conceived in a 
communitarian way.  
Outlook: Dual Nationality and Master-Mechanisms of Political Change 
In the case of dual nationality, we can identify two mechanisms engendering path-dependent 
effects. In particular, lock-in and disincentive mechanisms and their effects have resulted in 
the ‘stickiness’ of the policy path.  
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First, the lock-in mechanism means that certain options are rendered almost wholly 
unattainable by the original choices made. Examples are norms such as gender equity or jus 
soli. The German Constitutional Court considered in 1974 dual nationality as an “evil” in 
principle. Nevertheless, in terms of gender equity, it maintained that nationality can be 
transferred to children by the father and the mother. The jus soli rule in the USA has 
traditionally been interpreted as emanating from the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. 
Therefore, a change of qualification of the principle would require either another 
Constitutional Amendment or a far-reaching reinterpretation of the clause (cf. Aleinikoff and 
Klusmeyer, 2002:12). Taken together, these two principles have resulted in a pervasive 
growth of dual nationality in the attribution of political membership by marriage, birth and 
family formation. It is hard to imagine that such principles will be reversed because they are 
partly enshrined in national constitutions and international conventions. Second, a 
disincentive effect means that original choices make future options not impossible but deeply 
unattractive to policy-makers. For example, while efforts aiming at multicultural policies 
towards immigrants are prone to reversal, policy-makers often have not done so. Instead, 
they have relabeled ‘multicultural’ into ‘integration’ policies without a change in substance in 
Sweden, or refocused efforts from politico-cultural ‘minority’ policies to socio-economic 
‘integration’ policies in the Netherlands. Moreover, the pervasive growth of rights of 
permanent residents viz. denizens has put the issue of political rights for non-citizens as a 
means of incorporation on the table. 
However, path-dependent developments are not immune to reversal. In general, this means 
that choice points and alternatives exist (North, 1990:98-9). In principle, there are two 
mechanisms which could lead to a reversal, exogenous shocks and learning. First, it is easy 
to imagine that factors exogenous to the law and politics of nationality and citizenship 
impinge on their development. The most obvious are armed conflicts between national states 
which form international migration systems. Although historical comparisons need to be 
handled with utmost care, it is suggestive that during World Wars One the public loyalties of 
immigrants became a matter of concern. More recent wars between immigration and 
emigration countries and September 11 have renewed public debates about the loyalty of 
immigrants (Faist, 2003). For instance, dual nationality has been discussed in the 
Netherlands as a means to expel undesired citizens of immigrant background. After all, they 
still have nationality of at least one other country (cf. de Hart, 2003).  
 
The second mechanism – ‘learning’ – can be easily observed. The Dutch case is particularly 
instructive in this regard. For some years during the 1980s, the franchise for denizens and 
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dual nationality were seen as instruments of overall immigrant integration, even beyond the 
political realm. Later, however, some parties declared the focus on cultural minority policies a 
failure and, in essence, the emphasis of public policies shifted to socio-economic integration 
into labor and housing markets. Concomitantly, during the 1990s, goals such as the 
congruence of the resident population and the people and instruments such as dual 
nationality became more contested, as criteria such as the alleged effectiveness of 
incorporation policies – output legitimacy – gained in importance. Learning in this case 
reflected a growing skepticism towards minority policies which, among other things, implied 
collective rights for immigrant groups. Ironically, dual nationality – the relaxation of the 
renunciation requirement – served as a tool to continue cultural pluralist policies in the 
publicly more acceptable frame of individual rights. 
The spread of dual nationality as a path-dependent process may very well continue. This is 
especially likely under the propitious circumstances of supranational integration in regional 
governance structures such as the EU. Seen in this way, the increasing tolerance towards dual 
nationality may well be interpreted as part of a centuries-long expansion of rights for citizens 
and denizens in states characterized by some form of rule of law. On the international level, this 
is signaled by a growing tendency to interpret nationality as a human right and to apply 
provisions favoring gender equity. On the national level, rights for permanent residents which 
approach those of citizens also point towards an increasing emphasis of individual rights vis-à-
vis state sovereignty. The driving forces which enabled lock-ins to emerge have to be sought in 
group conflicts (cf. Tilly, 1996). These conflicts are, as in the case of social rights, not simply be 
found in working class strength but also preventive elite counterstrategies, the most well-known 
outcome of which is the Bismarckian welfare state. Given the absence of formidable immigrant 
political strength in virtually all European immigration countries, the increasing tolerance towards 
dual nationality is clearly a symbolic effort by ruling elites to accommodate immigrants and to 
live up to international norms. The political conflicts and discourses around dual citizenship have 
been shaped by reference to established yet changing understandings of nationhood and 
immigrant incorporation, political cultures and constitutional principles. 
In this analysis the path-dependent view has been primarily used to explain cross-national 
differences. Yet this concept could also be applied to describe convergent processes of 
increasing toleration reaching across the national states described. The relevant mechanism 
could be called a democratic proliferation. Liberal democracies tend to face this dilemma when 
adhering to the principle of avoiding dual nationality as far as possible. Because of the 
importance of individual rights, liberal democracies are compelled to accept dual nationality 
upon naturalization if the respective other state makes renouncing nationality impossible, or 
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imposes unreasonable demands. Also, liberal democracies tend to accept dual nationality in the 
name of gender equity when nationality is acquired by birth. Furthermore, such states may be 
inclined to grant dual citizenship within regional governance systems such as the EU. But once 
some exceptions have been granted, new interpretations of individual rights and new claims of 
other categories of persons combined with court cases could easily lead to a further increase of 
exceptions. This could result in a proliferation of ‘exception groups’. The more exceptions and 
thus potential claimant groups, the greater the likelihood that questions of legitimating different 
treatment arise because each exemptions have to be justified on reasonable grounds. Problems 
of justification and rising costs of administrative procedures may well lead to a general tolerance 
of dual citizenship on the long run. In the rather restrictive German case, for example, it is not 
unlikely that unequal treatment as a consequence of the so-called ‘option model’ (cf. Figure 1) 
could result in increased tolerance. Most probably, the Federal Constitutional Court will have to 
decide whether this clause can be upheld. 
In a sanguine view, one possible long-term outcome is that dual nationality could serve as a 
bridging construct for supranational and multilayered forms of political membership. Immanuel 
Kant once drew attention to the alternative of a “federation of free republics” on the level of 
states to avoid the twin dangers of global tyranny, on the one hand, and the anarchy of 
sovereign states, on the other (Kant, 1970). Applied to the case at hand, dual nationality would 
interface the world of states and the world of societies by institutionalizing the border-crossing, 
overlapping social and symbolic ties among citizens and between citizens and states. Seen in 
this way, dual citizenship as overlapping political membership does not constitute a break 
with the Westphalian system of state sovereignty (cf. Ruggie, 1993) – but may be a 
mechanism in post-Westphalian systems such as the European Union to advance the 
integration of national and supranational forms of membership in political communities. 
Indirectly, the nationally distinct modes of immigrant political incorporation would then 
continue to be shaped by varying yet increasing degrees of tolerance towards and even 
acceptance of dual nationality.  
It is by no means clear, however, that such an optimistic perspective is warranted. The key 
assumption behind such an optimistic scenario, namely a rather peaceful state system, is 
historically contingent, applicable to certain regions of the world only, and continuously 
changing. The postnational perspective has only focused on international law and 
transnational discourses, forgetting much of the ‘hard’ factors of the international state 
system. Much of the future course of border-crossing citizenship would depend on the 
development of national states and the international system of states. In other words, social 
integration of immigrants on the national level also depends on the interactions among the 
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system of states, an aspect of international system integration (cf. Hollifield, this volume). 
Outside the OECD world, statehood has by no means developed along the successful 
Western model of governance in territorially bounded, rule-of-law, democratic and 
interventionist entities. And it is an open question whether statehood in the OECD world 
continues along the path taken after World War Two. At the very least, a comprehensive 
analysis of the course of (dual) citizenship needs to take into account the international 
system and the states within migration systems, thus moving beyond the myopic concern 
with major Western immigration countries. 
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Figure 1: Access to Nationality in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands (after 2000) 
    Germany Sweden The Netherlands
As-of-right  
naturalization 
after 8 years of residence; conditions 
attached: no welfare dependency; language 
test: evidence of sufficient knowledge of 
German  
as-of-right after 5 years of residence (5 years for 
citizens from non-Nordic countries; 2 years for 
citizens from Nordic countries) 
as-of-right after 5 years of lawful residence; 
conditions attached: ability to conduct a simple 
conversation in Dutch was deemed sufficient 
(until recently); criterion of “being 
incorporated” did not play any role in practice; 
now: language proficiency and citizenship 
courses required  
Second and 
subsequent 
generations 
jus sanguinis; jus soli, provided that one 
parent has lived for eight years in Germany or 
holds a permanent residence permit for at 
least three years (since 2000); also: educated 
in Germany for 8 years for second generation 
(since 1991) 
jus sanguinis, coupled with socialization 
principle for those born or raised in Sweden 
jus sanguinis & limited form of jus soli: option 
right (since 1984); foreign children born in the 
Netherlands have an ‘option right’; they can 
acquire Dutch nationality by unilateral 
declaration between the ages of 18 and 25 
Dual 
nationality 
accepted for ethnic Germans; and in specific 
circumstances, such as economic loss 
involved or when country of origin does not 
allow expatriation; ‘optional principle’ if the 
child obtains the parents’ nationalit(ies), she 
must give up the non-German or German 
nationality before reaching the age of 23 
dual citizenship explicitly allowed since 2001; no 
requirement to renounce former nationality; 
before 2001, the rules were as restrictive as in 
Germany 
dual citizenship allowed as a rule (1991-97); 
since then a wide range of exceptions; further 
restrictions are now (2003) widely discussed 
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